







Economy and Environment Program  
for Southeast Asia WHAT IS EEPSEA? 
The Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia was established in May 1993 
to support training and research in environmental and resource economics.  Its goal is to 
strengthen local capacity in the economic analysis of environmental problems so that 
researchers can provide sound advice to policy-makers. The program uses a networking 
approach to provide financial support, meetings, resource persons, access to literature, 
publication avenues, and opportunities for comparative research across its nine member 
countries.  These are Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, 
Lao PDR, China, and Papua New Guinea.  
EEPSEA’s structure consists of a Sponsors Group, comprising all donors contributing at 
least USD 100,000 per year, an Advisory Committee of senior scholars and policy-
makers, and a secretariat in Singapore. EEPSEA is a project administered by the 













EEPSEA TECHNICAL REPORTS 
EEPSEA Technical Reports include studies that are either too academic and/or technical 
for wider circulation. It also includes research work that are based on short-term inquiries 
on specific topics (e.g. case studies) and those that  are already published as part of 
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This research is funded under the financial support of the IDRC Fellowship No. 
003591-102. The project funded by EEPSEA, entitled “Integrating Social Capital into 
Institutional Analysis—Some Empirical and Methodological Examinations”, has two 
components: 
Component 1: Integrating Social Capital into Institutional Analysis for the first 
CDM Forest Project in the World. 
Component 2: Measuring Trust in an Ethnically Diverse Region in China 
This report presents the first component of the research, while a separate report has 
been made for the second component.   
Paying developing countries for carbon sequestration is a vital component of climate 
change mitigation.  If appropriately designed, these payments can also transfer income to 
poor villagers, which can help achieve the goals of long-term sustainability for the carbon 
sequestration project and of poverty reduction. Using data on reforestation and a survey 
of village stakeholders, this paper made an assessment whether or not the world’s first 
CDM forest-based carbon sequestration project implemented in China could 
simultaneously reach its environmental and developmental objectives.  Although the 
Guangxi project is widely heralded as a model CDM project, still less than half of the 
project land remain unforested at the time of surveys conducted in September of 2007
1. 
The survey revealed one major cause to relatively low participation to the carbon project, 
highlights the important role of social capital in this initiative.  
 
                                                            
1 It is important to note that at the time of survey, the project was still under the implementation stage.  Big 
progresses on tree plantings have been made since the survey time.   2 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Interest in implementing CDM forest projects has been increasing, especially after 
the 13
th Conference of Parties (COP 13) of the United Nations Framework for Climate 
Change Conventions (UNFCCC) held in Bali in 2007. In the conference, projects on 
reducing emissions from deforestation and ecosystem degradation (REDD) were added to 
the list of eligible CDM forest projects that originally included only 
afforestation/reforestation projects.  
In developing countries, ideal CDM forest projects, especially small-scale ones, 
should be accessible and profitable so as to benefit local land users. At the same time, 
these projects should effectively provide a global environmental service – that is, climate 
change mitigation. However, designing and implementing CDM forest projects is 
challenging. While the first CDM forest project in the world that is implemented in China 
is showing many signs of success, only about 55 percent of the designed tree-planting 
activities have been accomplished.  What may be the reason for the low participation rate 
of the local communities and the low project outcome?   
Using the field data from China’s CDM project area, this study evaluated the project, 
specifically the roles played by institutional arrangements and social capital in project 
implementation. Findings can guide the design and implementation of future CDM forest 
projects, especially in developing countries.   
The CDM forest projects are funded through a payment for environmental services 
(PES) system, where buyers from developed countries make direct payment to sellers in 
developing countries for carbon credits. The carbon credits are generated by carbon 
sequestration through afforestation/reforestation activities or through reduced emissions 
from deforestation and ecological degradation (REDD) resulting from conservation 
activities. These direct payments benefit the service providers of climate change 
mitigation who are usually small-scale land users or among the poor in the community 
(Pagiola et al., 2005). Hence, improvement of local livelihood is an integral part of CDM 
forest projects (Smith and Scherr, 2003).  
To truly benefit from the CDM forest projects, local land users must be willing and 
able to participate in the PES system (Pagiola, 2007). Their willingness to participate is 
largely determined by the profitability of participation, while their ability to participate is 
affected by technical and financial constraints, high transaction costs, investment costs, 
and tenure issues. In other words, they will only be willing to participate when they are 
better-off by participating, and the payment level is at least equal to the opportunity cost 
of their second-best land use (Pagiola et al., 2005; Pagiola et al., 2007).  However, their 
technical and financial constraints can be partly relaxed by some institutional and 
contractual arrangements, such as upfront payment, access to credit, market, and 
technical assistance (Pagiola et al., 2005; Wunder, 2005; Tschakert et al., 2007).  
High transaction costs are commonly associated with forest carbon projects (Milne, 
1999; van Kooten, Shaikh, and Suchanek, 2002). These costs typically include expenses 3 
 
for project design, regulatory approval, validation, registration, information search, 
negotiation, signing and implementation of contracts, monitoring, insurance, verification 
and certification (Australian Greenhouse Office, 2005; Milne 1999), communication with 
project partners, and fulfillment of contracted obligations by all parties (Smith and 
Scherr, 2003). Some transaction costs, such as those for project design, approval, 
validation, registration, and monitoring are fixed regardless of the project size. These 
fixed transaction costs account for the major part of the transaction costs in forest carbon 
projects (Australian Greenhouse Office 2005, Milne 1999). Therefore, the average 
transaction costs for individual small-scale land users to undertake forest carbon 
sequestration projects can be high.  As such, transaction costs must be seen as critical 
factors in designing and implementing CDM forest projects that are truly accessible to 
poor and small-scale land users.     
Pooling or bundling individual activities of potential but poor participants to make 
them more competitive and letting smallholders sign collective contracts so as to spread 
the transaction costs over a larger group have partially addressed the problem of 
transaction costs (Australian Greenhouse Office, 2005; Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Wunder, 
2005; Pagiola, 2007).  Pooling has the major advantage of reducing transaction cost and 
risk because [1] pooling through the aggregation and bundling of individual activities can 
reduce the average transaction cost, given that the major part of the transaction costs 
associated with forest carbon projects, such as costs of project design, approval, 
validation, registration and monitoring, is fixed regardless of the project size (Australian 
Greenhouse Office 2005, Milne 1999); [2] pooling can help disperse small-scale land 
users’ risks since  the risks can be scattered over a larger geographical area in case of 
disasters (Richardson 2005) and smoothed against yearly fluctuations across individual 
plots and fields (Carter 1987).  However, by design, pooling requires collective actions, 
the success of which can be dependent on formal and informal institutions. Informal 
institutions are closely related to social capital, which is generally defined as the 
connections among individuals, i.e., networks, norms, trust, concern for one’s associates, 
and willingness to sanction violators of rules or norms (Bowles and Gintis, 2002; 
Putnam, 2000). 
Social capital facilitates and maintains cooperation in collective actions by reducing 
mutual monitoring cost; increasing the credibility of social sanction; facilitating 
interactions among individuals; providing common knowledge or information about the 
reliability of their peer members; and helping organize information sharing and 
coordination of activities (Sobel, 2002; Grootaert, 1998; Besley et al., 1993).  A high 
level of social capital reduces the cost of monitoring and enforcing formal rules among 
individuals in the management of common pool resources (Gibson et al., 2005). Social 
capital is often an alternative (substitute) for formal institutions to maintain cooperation 
towards collective actions among a common pool of resource users (Ostrom, 1992).   
However, when the initial social networks of mutual reciprocity, obligations, and 
sanctions existing at the local level are not strong enough to enable local resource users to 
take collective actions that would jointly benefit them, formal institutions should be 
created.  The share-holding system adopted by China’s world forest project has enabled 
collective actions at the local area.  4 
 
China’s first CDM forest project, Facilitating Reforestation for Guangxi Watershed 
Management in Pearl River Basin in China (hereafter called Guangxi project), can 
represent the design and implementation of similar CDM forest projects elsewhere. First, 
it shares common characteristics with other CDM projects such as the high transaction 
and establishment costs. Second, its implementation is affected by technical, institutional, 
and socio-economic factors. For instance, local communities withdraw from the project 
because of contractual rules and tenure issues, and their low participation in the project 
results to technical difficulties in rehabilitating seriously degraded lands. Third, while 
there is wide global interest on the implementation of CDM forest projects, we lack 
information or lessons from the field. Hence, this research tried to assess the constraints 
in designing and implementing these projects among small-scale land users, especially in 
developing countries. 
The paper had three main objectives:  [1] to evaluate the performance of the project; 
[2] to assess the impacts of social capital and contractual rules on project implementation; 
and [3] to draw some useful lessons for the design and implementation of future CDM 
forest projects. 
2.  GUANGXI CARBON PROJECT 
 
The Guangxi carbon project, a part of a World Bank’s umbrella project entitled 
“Guangxi Integrated Forestry Development and Conservation Project”, was designed to 
reforest 4,000 ha of multiple-use forests on seriously degraded and remote lands to reach 
multiple environmental and developmental objectives.  The area started to be developed 
in early 2005, and it became the world’s first CDM forest project that was registered in 
the CDM Executive Board (EB) in 2006. It is being implemented in Cangwu and 
Huanjiang Counties in China’s Southern Province of Guangxi (Map 1).   
 
 
Map 1.  A Location map of the Guangxi Carbon Project 
Data source: Guangxi Project Development Document, 2006 5 
 
2.1. Multiple environmental and developmental objectives of the project 
 
The establishment of 4,000-ha multiple-use forests on seriously degraded marginal 
lands aimed to address multiple environmental and developmental objectives. These 
included carbon sequestration, biodiversity enhancement, soil erosion control, and 
improved local livelihood. The multiple-use forests were planned to be established using 
a combination of six tree species. Of the 4,000 ha of land to be regenerated, 3,000 ha of 
lands would be planted with a mixture of five native tree species and 1,000 ha would be 
planted with one single tree species - eucalyptus (Eucalyptus sp.) (Table 1).   
  









Eucalyptus 500  500  100%  10 
Sweetgum: Chinese red pine  0  1050  6:4  17:30 
Sweetgum : Chinese fir  0  450  6:4  17:30 
Chinese red pine : oak  900  0  6:4  30:7 
Chinese red pine: Chinese Gugertree  600  0  6:4  30:17 
Total 2000  2000     
 Data source: Guangxi Project Development Document, 2006 
 
The project was expected to sequester 0.77 megatons (Mt) of CO2e over a 30-year 
crediting period (2006-2035), with about 0.34 Mt of CO2e by 2012 and 0.46 Mt of CO2e 
by 2017. The carbon benefit would be generated using environment-friendly techniques 
in planting the six tree species selected.   
The six tree species have different carbon sequestration rates and rotation periods 
(Table 1), thus they were expected to produce a relatively smooth annual net carbon sink 
curve and deliver a stable amount of carbon credits over the crediting period.  Some 
species like oak, eucalyptus, and sweetgum, having higher growth rate but shorter 
rotation period, can sequester carbon at a higher rate in the early stage of the crediting 
period. Other species like Chinese fir and Chinese red pine, having lower growth rate in 
the early stage but longer rotation period, can sequester a higher total amount of carbon 
over the whole crediting period.   Figure 1 presents the annual and accumulative carbon 




















Year s Net   CO2 r em oval  ( t C) Car bon  s t oc k
 
Figure 1: annual and accumulative carbon sinks by the Guangxi carbon project 
Data source: Guangxi Project Development Document ，2006 
 
The project was also expected to generate other environmental benefits such as 
biodiversity enhancement and soil erosion control.  The project’s forest coverage would 
be expanded by 1.34%.  The soil erosion control in seriously degraded lands would be 
improved.  Since some of the regenerated lands were located adjacent a national nature 
reserve, regenerated forests were seen to shelter wildlife and enhance the viability of 
wildlife populations in the protected areas (Project Development Document, 2006).  
Local livelihood was expected to improve through the generation of income and the 
creation of employment opportunities. For instance, harvesting and selling of timbers and 
pine resins were allowed in the project area as guided by the Project Development 
Document (2006).  The expected total income from selling certified carbon credits was 
US$ 2.0 million; of timber products, US$ 5.5 million; and of pine resins, US$ 3.5 
million.  This expected revenue would be shared among the local communities and the 
three local forest companies according to mutually agreed upon revenue-sharing rules 
under the share-holding system (details are discussed later). The income generated was 
especially important for ethnic minorities living in remote areas of the Huanjiang County, 
who speak little or no Chinese but their own ethnic language, and who have little outside 
options for earning cash income.   The local communities could also expect employment 
and income from the project through tree planting, weeding, harvesting, resin collection, 
and forest management.   7 
 
2.2. Project baseline and “additionality” 
 
For a CDM project to deliver real carbon benefits, it must demonstrate 
“additionality”
2, implying that the carbon sequestration added by a CDM project would 
not have occurred otherwise (Haupt and von Lüpke, 2007). The stated baseline of the 
Guangxi CDM project is that the barren lands would “remain abandoned and degrade” 
(section B.2 in PDD, 2006). Before the CDM forest project, most of the 4,000 ha of lands 
were predominantly covered with grasses or shrubs, except for about 35 ha covered with 
scattered trees.  While these lands, which were mainly deforested in 1960s, were 
restricted to forest use under the Chinese law, they have not been reforested before the 
CDM project because of the lack of private or public investment.  The Guangxi CDM 
project then was an ‘additional’ because without carbon financing, the project would not 
likely be reforested.  
Before the CDM project, the private business sector had little incentive to reforest 
the seriously degraded and remote lands because of the low rate of return on investment 
(section B.3 of PDD, 2006). Along with the carbon financing, the provincial and local 
governments contributed additional financial support and coordination to overcome some 
previous financial and institutional barriers faced by reforestation projects. In this sense, 
the provincial and local governments, in facilitating the project, acted as intermediaries. 
In terms of economic returns, without the mix of carbon financing and government 
financial support, investment on regenerating seriously degraded and remote lands had an 
internal rate of investment (IRR) of only 8.53%, which is lower than the required rate of 
return (12%) set by the Chinese government for forest investment (section B.3 of PDD, 
2006). With the additional revenue from carbon credits sold at a fixed price of US 
$4.5/ton of CO2e for the crediting period of 2006 to 2035 and with incomes from the sale 
of carbon credits combined with government financing, the IRR of the investment 
increased to 15.02% (section B.3 of PDD, 2006) – a rate that made forest investment 
attractive. 
2.3. Land tenure arrangement in the project area 
 
The 4,000 ha of lands (2,000 ha in Cangwu and 2,000 ha in Huanjiang) covered by 
the project had two types of land tenure arrangements, i.e., individual lands (1098.4 ha) 
and communal lands (2,901.6 ha).  The individually managed lands had been contracted 
to each farmer’s households under a 50-year contract period since the early 1980s. The 
communal lands, on the other hand, were being managed by natural villages
3.  About 
55% (1098.4 ha) of lands in Cangwu were individual lands and the remaining 45% (901.6 
                                                            
2 To prove “additionality”, the project developers need to show that either the project is not economically or 
financially attractive without the additional payment, or it would not be able to overcome legal, 
technological or ecological barriers without the income of carbon credits (Haupt and von Lüpke, 2007). 
3 The Guangxi project involved both communal lands managed by natural villages and lands managed by 
individual famer households. In the Chinese context, natural villages are communities where people live 
together, while an administrative village consists of several natural villages, some of which may be located 
far away from each other. 8 
 
ha) were communal lands; all 2000 ha of lands in Huanjiang were communal lands.  
Some communal lands (mainly in Huanjiang County) did not have clearly delineated 
boundaries among natural villages.   
2.4. Pooling arrangement and the share-holding system   
 
The pooling arrangement and the share-holding system were unique arrangements 
adopted by the Guangxi carbon project. These systems were expected to create 
economies of scale so that financially and technically constrained small-scale and local 
land users could participate in the project and regenerate their barren lands. The pooling 
arrangement bundled barren lands from 27 villages (15 from Cagnwu and 12 from 
Huanjiang) to form a total project size of 4,000 ha (2,000 ha in Cangwu and 2,000 in 
Huanjiang). The share-holding system, on the other hand, was created among the local 
communities and the three local forest companies. Figure 2 presents the framework of the 
share-holding system. 
 
        The share-holding system involved two groups of stakeholders: the three local forest 
companies (two from Cangwu and one from Huanjiang) and the local communities from 
the 27 villages. To facilitate the participation of the local communities, three contractual 
rules were provided. First, the three local forest companies were fully responsible for 
investing capital and techniques on project design, forest regeneration and management, 
harvest and sale of the products; and for providing some necessary technical support and 
trainings to the local communities regarding the carbon project.  The local communities 
only needed to invest their individually managed or communal barren lands to the 
project. Second, the forest companies were allowed to regenerate 1,000 ha of eucalyptus 
plantations by leasing lands from local communities at the local land rent prevailing in 
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Fig. 2    A share  - -holding system created by the Guangxi carbon project
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2005 for 2006 to 2035 and to get subsidized loans and government financial support. 
Third, the local communities would receive 40% of the income from the sale of timber 
and pine resins and 60% from the sale of carbon credits produced from the 3,000 ha of 
forests planted to five native tree species other than eucalyptus. The local communities 
would only get income when the products have been sold.   
2.5. The collective contractual arrangement 
 
To pool the carbon credits and reduce the transaction costs, the collective contracts 
were signed following three steps.  First, the buyer, BioCarbon Fund, signed an overall 
contract with the Luhuan Forestry Development Company from Huanjiang County, 
which represented all sellers under the share-holding system.  Second, the Luhuan 
Forestry Development Company signed individual contracts with the other two forest 
companies, Kuangyuan and Fuyuan forest farms from Cangwu County.  Third, for 
communal lands, the three forest companies signed contracts with local community 
leaders. The community leaders further coordinated the income-sharing among the 
community members and with other communities. For individual lands, the forest 
companies signed the contracts directly with the household heads.   
2.6. Financial arrangements for the project 
 
Subsidized loans and government financing were the major financial arrangements 
for the project. For a total project investment of US$ 2,822,282, about 40% (US$ 
1,128,913) of the investment was made through subsidized loans at a rate of 6.21% to the 
local forest companies. About 40% (US$ 1,128,913) was financed by the Government of 
the Guangxi, and about 20% (US$564,465) was financed through commercial loans.   
The financial arrangements were intended to increase the economic attractiveness of 
the project and provide small-scale local forest companies with incentives to invest in 
CDM forest projects. This was because the more financially competitive, large-scale 
commercial forest companies were reluctant to invest on the CDM forest project. It is 
quite understandable given the much longer return period of investment and the lower 
return rate compared to commercial plantation projects.   Hence, hope was pinned on the 
small-scale local forest companies to invest on reforestation in remote and degraded lands 
for carbon sequestration and for local livelihood improvement.    
3.  THEORY AND PROPOSITIONS 
 
The research made three propositions on the roles played by social capital and 
contractual arrangements in the implementation of the Guangxi carbon project. The 
propositions were tested using anecdotal evidences collected from the surveyed villages. 
 
Proposition 1: When the social capital in the local area, such as density of social 
networks and collective norms, is not strong enough to enable local communities to 
coordinate among themselves so that they can collectively participate in the CDM carbon 10 
 
project, the pooling arrangement and the share-holding system created for the project are 
an effective substitute for the social capital to enable collective actions among the local 
communities. 
Proposition 2: When the income-sharing contracts are incomplete, i.e., the contracts 
do not consider all possible contingencies that can happen in the future, and the local 
communities do not trust their potential partners, the income-sharing contracts cannot 
provide incentives for the local communities to participate in a long-term relationship 
with the local forestry companies, despite the foreseeable profits from participation.  
Proposition 3:  When there is no clear delineation of property rights over the land, 
dispute resolution mechanisms, and mutual trust among local communities, income-
sharing contracts cannot be enforced.   
4.  METHODOLOGY 
 
This section discusses an assessment framework that was used to evaluate the 
Guangxi carbon project and the data used to fulfill the objectives of the research.  
4.1.  An overall assessment framework 
 
An assessment framework (Fig. 3) was developed to guide the evaluation of the 
project by focusing on two major objectives of the project, i.e., carbon sequestration and 
local livelihood enhancement.  The framework was based on the original concepts of 
Hanley et al. (1999), Pagiola et al. (2005), Pagiola (2007), and Wunder (2005). However, 





































Opportunity costs  
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Efficiency and effectiveness, which are commonly used in evaluating policies 
(Hanley et al., 1999) and programs (Bacha and Rodriguez, 2007; Sierra and Russman, 
2006), were used to evaluate the two major objectives of carbon sequestration and local 
livelihood enhancement. Measured were the efficiency of local livelihood enhancement 
(objective 1) and the effectiveness of carbon sequestration and local livelihood 
enhancement (objectives 2 and 3).  Efficiency was measured in terms of [1] profitability 
to local communities from their participation, which can determine their incentive to 
participate in the project; [2] the overall profitability of the project because in order for 
the local communities to profit, the overall project should be necessarily profitable as 
well; [3] the opportunity costs to local communities in participating in the CDM project 
in terms of forgone benefits from leasing their lands to commercial companies that 
develop industry plantations.  Effectiveness, on the other hand, was measured by the 
expected deliverability of the carbon credits and by the local communities’ participation 
level.    
The evaluation framework included the impact of contractual rules and social capital 
or the participation of the local communities.  Contractual rules, such as revenue-sharing 
rules and upfront payment, could determine the local communities’ expected revenues 
and their revenue streams, and thus, their ex ante incentives to participate in the project.  
Social capital, on the one hand, could affect collective actions (Baland and Plauteau, 
1996; Ostrom, 1991), and collective actions can be induced by the carbon pooling and 
share-holding system designed for the Guangxi carbon project.   
Added to the evaluation framework was uncertainty. The implementation of long-
term CDM forest carbon projects entails uncertainties, which were evaluated by project 
outcomes rather than by absolute quantitative terms.  Project outcomes were important in 
evaluating the overall performance of the project; these were used to evaluate the 
realization of potential profitability and deliverability of expected carbon credits.    
Not considered yet in the evaluation framework were other environmental objectives 
of the project, such as biodiversity enhancement and soil erosion control.  This is because 
during the 2007 surveys, the project had only been implemented for two years, and there 
were still no discernable soil erosion control and biodiversity enhancement benefits. 
4.2.  Data 
 
Both primary and secondary data were collected for the research.   
 
Secondary data were obtained from government reports; field data collected by the 
local government regarding the implementation of the project; and raw data used to draft 
the Project Development Document that was submitted to the CDM Executive Board.  
The secondary data were used to evaluate the project implementation outcomes; calculate 
the profitability of project to local communities, and analyze the possible contributing 
factors to the current undesired outcomes, if they exist.   
 
Primary data were collected through personal interviews with local community 
leaders and through focus group discussions conducted in 14 villages, or over 50% of all 12 
 
villages involved in the project, in September of 2007.  Personal interviews were mainly 
conducted using questionnaires, while the focus group discussions were conducted using 
semi-structured questionnaires.  The focus group discussions were also held for staff 
members of local government officials, who were coordinating the project, and for 
managers of the local forest companies. 
   
Information collected from the focus group discussions held in surveyed villages 
mainly included socio-economic conditions, social relationships, land tenure issues, and 
contractual arrangements.  This information served as anecdotal evidences to test the 
propositions on the roles played by social capital and contractual rules in the design and 
implementation of the Guangxi carbon project.  Ideally, the measurement of the roles of 
social capital and contractual rules has to rely on rigorous econometric models using 
detailed survey data. However, given that the project was largely implemented in the 
villages, conducting detailed household surveys was not quite feasible.  Common 
research methods in social sciences or humanities, such as the narrative and qualitative 
methods using anecdotal evidences (Marcus, 1998; Densin and Lincoln, 2005: Yin, 2003; 
Geertz, 1973), were used to test the study’s three propositions.  
 
Village leaders were personally interviewed to collect primary data that would 
confirm and update the field inspection data collected by the local government agencies 
and other relevant secondary data, which were used to calculate the profitability of the 
project.   
 
Stratified sampling was applied to choose the villages to be covered in the study. 
First, the villages were stratified into three strata according to the progress of the 
project’s implementation. These were [1] villages with sound (full or almost full) 
implementation; [2] villages with medium level of implementation; and [3] villages with 
no implementation.  Second, within each stratum, villages to be surveyed were randomly 
sampled. 
5.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Carbon pooling arrangement, share-holding system, and financial arrangements 
through subsidized loans and government financing were the major elements that 
contributed to the success of China’s CDM project.    
5.1.  Project implementation outcomes and causes 
Field inspection data from the local government agencies showed that only 55% 
(about 2,210 ha) of the overall reforestation plan (4,000 ha) had been completed in 
September 2007.  Further, only 85% and 45% of the designated areas for plantations of 
eucalyptus and native tree species have been planted, respectively. Reasons for low 
accomplishments were obtained from information from the local government agencies 
and focus group discussions with the villagers (Table 2.  13 
 
Table 2.  Reasons for low level of plantation accomplishment  
 






































































Cangwu 305  0  0  14  49  253  621 
Huanjiang 64  257  639  49 134  16  1159 
Overall  369 257 639  63  183  270  1780 
Proportions 







As shown in Table 2, the major causes of reduced tree planting included the 
following: 
[1]  About 369 ha or 21% of the unplanted portion of the project’s lands (mostly 
individually-managed lands in Cangwu) have been withdrawn from the original 
contracts with the local forest companies. The first reason for the withdrawal of 
these lands was the increase in the opportunity cost of participation.  After the 
contract was signed, rental of lands in this area of Cangwu increased because of 
competition for barren lands from commercial forest companies that wanted to 
develop eucalyptus plantations. Land-users were also trying to renegotiate for a 
larger share of profits from timber products, resins, and carbon credits.  Ironically, 
the higher rental rate offered by the commercial forest companies for developing 
eucalyptus plantation may indicate that they would willing to forest these lands 
without the benefit of carbon money, hence making these lands no longer 
‘additional’. However, at the time of survey, local land users were still negotiating 
with the local forest companies.   
[2]  At least 14% (257 ha) of the area designated for reforestation would not be 
regenerated because of the extreme infertility of the severely degraded lands; such a 
problem was not identified during the project development stage.  
[3]  Over one-third of the unplanted lands faced particularly high cost and technical 
difficulties associated with reforestation. These lands were seriously degraded and 
located in extremely remote communal lands in Huanjiang.   
[4]  Other privately-held land was used to plant crop trees, specifically oranges in 
Cangwu. After the project was signed, orange prices increased, raising the 
opportunity cost of participating in the CDM project for these producers. As crop 
trees sequester carbon, as with those lands in [1], these privately-held lands no 
longer met the ‘additionality’ requirement. 
 14 
 
[5]  Unresolved land tenure disputes contributed to 10% (183 ha) of unfinished plans. 
Obstacles created by unresolved land tenure disputes for local communities to reach 
mutually agreed ratios for income-sharing could be alleviated if the local 
communities had sufficient social capital to coordinate among themselves the 
sharing of expected income.  Lack of social capital made this potential solution in 
some administrative villages impossible. 
[6]  About 10% (171 ha) of the unfinished plan was a result of a delayed schedule in tree 
planting because the villages were holding out for road-building before allowing 
planting to proceed (part of reason 6 in the Table 2).   
Although at least 14% of the area slated for reforestation could not be regenerated 
because of their extreme infertility, informants from the focus group discussions said that 
about half of the unfinished tree planting plans could be planted subject to reasons 1, 3 
and 5 in Table 3. These lands could be planted if more favorable contracts were offered 
to the local land users, if coordination for land dispute resolution is improved, and if 
stronger technical support was provided to regenerate seriously degraded lands.   
However, as noted above, there was a question as to whether those lands in [1] would still 
satisfy the ‘additionality’ requirement because the community’s alternative use (driving 
up their reservation utility) was also forestry-related. 
Essentially, the major elements leading to current failures could be categorized as: 
[1] unfavorable income-sharing ratio between local land users and local forest 
companies; [2] inability of the buyer’s homogeneous payment level to consider the 
heterogeneity of designated lands and the absence of upfront payment; [3] low level of 
some local land users’ trust in their trading partners, the local forest companies; and [4] 
unclear delineation of land tenures.  
5.2.  Potential profitability: providing potential benefits to local communities  
 
The overall project was potentially profitable with financial arrangements made for 
the project and with the additional income from sales of carbon credits.   The net present 
values (NPVs) of the project were all positive at a discount rate of 12%, except for the 
extreme scenario of the high land rent combined with low product prices. The 
computation of NPVs took into account all the investors, recalculated under four different 
scenarios representing different levels of opportunity cost of the lands and product prices.  
The IRR of the overall project also passed the required rate of return (12%) set by the 
Government of China for the approval of a CDM forest-based carbon sequestration 
project. 
From the financial point of view, participating local communities gained positive 
NPV by simply investing their lands in the CDM project and by sharing income with the 
local forest companies through the share-holding system, Hence, they should be willing 
to participate in the project. However, under the current contractual rules, they would get 
payment only upon the harvest of products.  Table 3 shows the NPVs under different 
discount rates.  15 
 
 
Table 3   Potential profit and opportunity costs of project to local communities 
Scenarios 
NPV at 8% 
(US$) 
NPV at 12% 
(US$) 
NPV at 20% 
(US$) 
1) NPVs of profit: low land rent prevailing 
in 2005, low product prices  2,531,472 1,449,493  650,748 
2) NPVs of profit: high land rent 
prevailing in 2007; low product prices   1,370,804 619,010  137,424 
3) Expected total income from leasing land 
to a commercial company at the 
prevailing prices in 2005 
372,158 266,287 164,593 
4) Expected income from leasing land to a 
commercial company at the prevailing 
prices in 2007 




Table 3 shows that the local communities’ NPVs participating in the project were all 
positive at different discount rates under scenarios 1 and 2. These were [1] when the 
product prices were on the low bound and the opportunity costs of the lands were on the 
low bound; and [2] when the product prices were on the low bound and the opportunity 
cost of the land were on the upper bound. Results indicated that the NPVs would also be 
positive under scenarios with medium or high levels of product prices.  
Scenarios 3 and 4 in Table 3 represent the local communities’ NPVs from the 
second-best use of their lands, i.e., leasing the land to the commercial companies at low 
land rentals and high rentals, respectively.  These two scenarios were essentially the local 
communities’ opportunity costs of participating in the CDM project under the 
assumptions that all the lands covered in the CDM project were productive enough to be 
rented to commercial companies.  Therefore, scenario 4 represents the upper bound of the 
local communities’ opportunity cost of participating in the project. 
Comparison of the local communities’ NPVs of benefit showed the following: when 
the land rentals of leasing lands to the commercial companies were maintained at 2005 
prevailing prices, the local communities’ profit from participating in the CDM project 
was expected to be higher than their foregone benefit of leasing the lands to commercial 
companies at a discount rate of 8% or 12%.  However, when the land rentals were 
increased to the prevailing prices in 2007, the local communities’ profit from 
participating in the CDM project was lower than their foregone benefit of leasing the 
lands to commercial companies.  This can explain why some local communities withdrew 
from their original contracts with local forest companies upon the increase of land rental 
prices starting 2005. 
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5.3.  Uncertainties of expected deliverability of the carbon credits and realization of 
potential profitability 
 
Given the poor implementation outcomes and pending solutions to problems in the 
project, it was highly uncertain for the local communities to realize the profitability of 
their participation and to expect the delivery of their carbon credits. The expected 
delivery of carbon credits in 2008 was delayed because the project’s implementation 
lagged behind schedule.  Moreover, the 14% degraded lands, which were impossible to 
reforest, affected the amount of expected deliverable carbon credits during the crediting 
period. The latter held true if replacement for this portion of land outside the current 
project boundaries was allowed by the CDM EB. Realization of the local communities’ 
potential profitability would depend on the negotiation outcomes between the local 
communities and the local forest companies, the resolution of land tenure disputes, and 
the technical support provided. 
5.4  Carbon pooling: resulting in low level of transaction costs  
 
The pooling arrangement entailed a relatively low level of average transaction cost 
in the Guangxi carbon project.   The average transaction cost of the project was estimated 
at about US$1.26 /tCO2e, which was calculated from the secondary data used in the 
Project Development Document.  These were on the lower bound of the average 
transaction cost (US$ 1 /tCO2e to US$ 235/tCO2e) of community-based forest carbon 
sequestration projects (Milne, 1999) and one-fifth of the average transaction cost 
(5.41//tCO2e) of forest carbon projects of the Actions Implemented Jointly (AIJ) 
implemented in the past in other developing countries (Milne, 1999).   The relatively low 
level of transaction costs was mainly attained through pooling in order to create 
economies of scales. 
5.5.  The share-holding system: allowing for the poor and small-scale local 
communities to participate 
 
Before the CDM forest project, the local communities were plagued with various 
problems such as high establishment and transaction costs; degraded lands; weak social 
capital in some villages; poor access to financial markets; and inadequate technical skills 
to regenerate degraded and remote lands in the project area.  However, the share-holding 
system integrated with carbon pooling and collective contractual arrangements created 
economies of scale and substituted for the weak social capital. Thus, this system enabled 
the local communities to participate in the project through collective actions.   
The high establishment and transaction costs, together with the small size of 
individual lands owned and prevalent poverty, made it impossible for the local 
communities to implement reforestation on their own. In the Guangxi carbon project, the 
establishment costs to regenerate the barren lands included the costs for tree planting and 
road construction to reach the remote lands.  Surveys showed that about one-third of the 
lands in the villages did not have road access before the project’s implementation. Given 
the average distance of about 2.8 km from the main roads and concerned project lands, 17 
 
the average cost for constructing roads  was estimated to be US$ 124 per ha. The total 
transaction cost for the Guangxi carbon project was estimated to be US$ 971,817, of 
which 60% was the fixed transaction cost.  This total transaction cost included project 
development cost, validation cost, annual verification cost and cost for due diligence by 
BioCarbon, negotiation cost, coordination cost, and other implementation costs. 
As for the lands, the average size of individual lands covered in the project ranged 
from 0.3 ha/family to 7.9 ha/family in Cangwu. Other local communities, especially those 
in Huanjiang, were poor and did not have access to local loans, hence making it difficult 
to implement the CDM forest project by individual members.  
The poor nature of the communal lands, together with the weak social capital in 
some communities, likewise made it difficult for the local communities to regenerate the 
communal lands on their own.  Some community leaders revealed during the surveys that 
their communities either did not have financial means or incentives to take collective 
actions to regenerate their communal lands. One reason for the lack of incentives to act 
together was the weak social capital, such as weak norms of mutual reciprocities, in some 
communities.  One typical example cited by some village leaders was as follows: while 
some villagers who had incentives attempted to regenerate their barren communal lands, 
other villagers who could earn incomes outside tree plantings and thus had little use of 
these lands, did not like their co-villagers benefiting without them benefiting as well, 
hence they prevented their co-villagers from reforesting these communal lands.    
The local community leaders pointed out that it was only through the share-holding 
system created by the Guangxi carbon project that they were able to participate in the 
project and start reforesting their barren lands. Previously, they lacked economies of scale 
in tree planting as well as technical skills and financial resources.  The share-holding 
system combined the comparative advantages of the local communities and local forestry 
companies. While the local communities had barren lands but lacked finance and skills to 
design and implement the CDM forest project, local forest companies with no lands had 
strong technical and financial capabilities for project development and implementation.  
Hence, the local communities could commit their barren lands to the CDM project over a 
30-year period and share income with the local forest companies according to the ratios 
mutually agreed upon during the project development stage. The local forest companies, 
on the other hand, would take full responsibilities for forest regeneration, forest 
management, and sale of products. Therefore, the share-holding system provided a viable 
means for the local communities to participate in the project.   
Further, the share-holding system helped substitute for the social capital needed for 
the local communities to engage in collective actions, such as participating in the project 
to gain joint benefits and welfare improvement.  Social capital embedded in informal 
institutions, like users groups within rural communities, provides central sustainable 
solutions to pursue sustainable livelihood and resource management that often involve 
rural communities’ collective actions (Pretty and Ward, 2001). Also, networks of mutual 
obligation encourage entrepreneurship within the local communities (Miguel et al., 
2005).  However, when the social capital in the local area, such as density of social 
networks and collective norms, is not strong enough to enable local communities to 18 
 
coordinate among themselves to collectively participate in a project, the share-holding 
system could be an effective substitute for social capital.  
In the Guangxi carbon project, social capital was vital because while the local 
communities could collectively commit their barren lands to the CDM project to form a 
minimum project size for economies of scale to operate, collective actions could not take 
place spontaneously. This was essentially the statement of proposition 1, which can be 
proven by anecdotal evidences from two villages in the project area.   
Anecdotal story 1: Success of share-holding system to enable collective action of local 
communities in Xinlong and Datong villages 
The villages of Xinlong and Datong in Cangwu County used to experience frequent field 
fires (two to three times a year). This was because some local communities traditionally 
burned crop stalks for fertilizer to enhance their agricultural productivity. However, the fires 
often razed the adjacent barren lands.  The villages also never regenerated these barren lands 
before the CDM project, revealed the village leaders. This was because first, because of the 
high risk of fires, commercial forest companies did not rent the barren lands. Second, the 
village members had few incentives to plant trees, not only because of the high risks of fires, 
but also because norms of mutually monitoring and punishing members who ruin young trees 
were very weak in the villages. Third, norms of mutual reciprocity were very weak, and 
networks that could play the role of coordinators in the villages were lacking.   
There was low labor supply for regenerating the barren lands, especially the communal 
barren lands, because some villagers had other options apart from the project. They usually 
had family members working in cities or earning off-farm incomes.  On the other hand, some 
villagers who had few options tried to regenerate the communal lands to earn incomes. 
However, as mentioned earlier, some villagers opposed the scheme. Laws in China stipulate 
that whoever plant trees can own the trees and earn income, even from trees that they would 
plant in communal lands. Villagers with good outside options and benefiting little from the 
actions of villagers with few outside options did not allow the latter to regenerate the 
communal barren lands. 
The above problem was not addressed. No individuals or associations in the villages took 
a lead in discussing or coordinating among the villagers any benefit-sharing schemes so that 
the villagers can support each other and ensure that any initiatives for reforestation by some 
members would be successful.  As a result, the communal lands had been barren since they 
were deforested in the early 1980s. As some village leaders lamented during the interviews: 
“Members in our villages do not like others to benefit from the communal barren lands.”    
The share-holding system, however, addressed the local communities’ previous 
constraints for participation and enabled them to undertake collective actions.  The local 
communities could expect a certain share of income in the future by collectively contributing 
their barren lands to the CDM project, while the local forest companies would take full 
responsibility for the production and sale of products from the project.  Under these 
expectations, the local communities were willing and able to participate in the CDM project.  
Indeed, all designated barren lands (100%) for the carbon project in Xinlong Village and 
97% of the designated lands in Datong Village have been successfully regenerated by the 
time of the surveys.      19 
 
 
5.6  Trust: vital for project implementation 
 
The low level of trust of some local communities on their partners - the local forest 
companies - partly explains why even the share-holding system was unable to engage 
local communities in the potentially profitable project.  Trust matters, especially when 
contracts signed between the villagers and the companies may be unable to cover all 
contingencies in the future, hence involving risks.  If the local communities did not 
sufficiently trust the local forest companies, they would believe that the latter would harm 
their interests after the contracts were signed. Because of this perception, some local 
communities decided not to enter into income-sharing contracts with the local forest 
companies, even if they quite foresaw the profitability of their participation. This 










Anecdotal story 2: local communities’ low trust in their partners leading to zero 
participation rate in Dayan village. 
In Dayan Village, located in Shatou Township in Cangwu, 86.7 ha of individual 
lands were designed to be planted with Chinese red pine and oak trees.  However, the 
tree planting, which was planned to be accomplished in the spring of 2007, never 
materialized. With the intervention of local forest agencies, the local forest companies 
eventually agreed to provide the villages with a special contract wherein they would 
assume responsibility for the tree plantings while giving the local communities the future 
incomes from the project. Despite the obvious advantage of this contract, the local 
communities in Dayan Village still hesitated to sign the contract.  Rather, they preferred 
to plant trees on their own with the necessary technical and financial support from local 
forest companies or local forest agencies.   
During the village-level focus group discussions, the village members admitted that 
they did not believe that they would get full income from the trees planted if the local 
forest companies were also involved in the tree plantings.  According to the villagers, 
since laws in China stipulated that “whomever plant trees owns trees”, then the local 
forest companies can later claim future incomes from the trees even if they promised 
otherwise. Their real concern actually was not in the income sharing per se, but rather on 
the possibility that the forest companies (who were also involved in forest planting and 
management) would claim all the income from products that would be produced and 
sold. Because of extreme lack of trust on local forest companies, the local communities 
did not participate in the CDM project’s share-holding system. 20 
 
5.7.  Land tenure disputes and weak social capital  
 
Land tenure disputes and weak social capital constrained some local communities in 
making collective decisions on land investment and income distribution as demonstrated 
in Cuishan Village. 
6.  Anecdotal story 3: land tenure disputes and weak social capital made enforcement 
of income-sharing contracts difficult in Cuishan Village.  
Based on the village-level surveys, Cuishan has 20 natural villages, and the farthest 
distance between the two natural villages was about 15 km. About 80% of the households 
had access to electricity, but only one natural village had road access.   
The village had a total area of 426 ha of communal lands covered by the CDM 
project. The communal barren lands were left as is or used for grazing.  The natural 
villages initially agreed to participate in the CDM project when the project was still in the 
development stage.   However, about 30% (126 ha) of the lands could not be successfully 
planted because these were not clearly delineated among the different natural villages.  
Further, these villages could not coordinate among themselves to resolve tenure disputes 
and agree on mutually accepted income-sharing contracts. The villagers had few 
interactions because of inaccessible roads and sparsely distributed natural villages. In 
addition, because most of the recently appointed village leaders were in their middle ages 
and were involved in off-farm activities, they could not effectively coordinate among 
natural villages.  As a result of land tenure disputes and weak social capital in the villages, 
some natural villages decided to postpone their participation in the CDM project until the 
disputes were resolved. The resolution would come through the coordination efforts of 
external government agencies, such as local forest agencies. These agencies have 
developed relatively strong bonds with the village through their previous technical 




The Guangxi forest carbon project has been quite a success by creating a unique 
share-holding system that was integrated into the pooling and collective contractual 
arrangements in communities. This system enabled local communities with technical, 
financial, and institutional constraints to participate in and benefit from the project, which 
was potentially profitable with subsidized loan policy and government financing support. 
The share-holding system also helped create economies of scale through the reduction of 
transaction costs, which were commonly high for forest carbon projects.     
The project was potentially a win-win option for the local communities and the local 
forest companies, who were the key stakeholders of the share-holding system, because 
the project was profitable to both parties.  However, only 55% of the overall reforestation 
plan had been accomplished because of the technical challenges faced in regenerating 
seriously degraded lands; the withdrawal of the local communities that were unsatisfied 
with the original contracts offered by the local forest companies from the project; and the 
land tenure disputes.  Moreover, the project faced many difficulties in fulfilling at least 
14% of its remaining reforestation plan. The plan’s implementation, however, can be 
improved considerably through better contractual arrangements; coordination for tenure 
conflict resolutions; and technical support from external expert teams. The non-
fulfillment of the remaining plan can reduce the efficiency gain of the project and 
expected deliverability of the carbon credits specified by the PDD.  
Social capital interacted with the contractual rules underlying the share-holding 
system to impact the local communities’ ability and willingness to participate in the 
project. Participation was critical for realizing the key objective of enhancing local 
livelihood in the project area.  When the social capital in the local area was not strong 
enough to induce participation, the share-holding system was an effective substitute to 
enable local communities to take collective actions for joint benefits.  On the other hand, 
the feasibility of income-sharing contracts underlying the share-holding system depended 
on the local communities’ level of trust on their partners, i.e., the local forest companies. 
Moreover, when land boundaries among local communities were not well-defined, social 
capital such as the local communities’ mutual trust and existing networks in the local area 
for conflict resolution can be affected and reduce their willingness to take  collective 
actions for joint benefits.  
Two implications can be drawn from this research regarding the design and 
implementation of CDM forest projects.  First, when the local social capital is weak, 
certain effective contractual arrangements must be created to enable local communities 
take collective actions.  Second, with weak social capital to support self-enforcement 
mechanisms of local communities, land tenure issues (such as unclear delineation of the 
boundaries of the lands) can critically hamper the implementation of the CDM forest 
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